

Political Economy of Natural Resources

PPPE6370

Spring 2020

F 1:00pm - 3:45pm

JO 4.708

Professor: Jonas Bunte

Office: Green Hall 3.520

E-mail: bunte@utdallas.edu

Office Phone: 972-883-3526

Office Hours: Mon 4:00pm-5:00pm

<http://www.utdallas.edu/~bunte/>

Course Description

Does oil undermines democracy? Why do natural resources have a positive effect on growth in Botswana but a negative impact in Nigeria? Is there a relationship between natural resources and (civil) war? This course explores the politics of natural resources. We analyze the effect of natural resources on a variety of economic and political issues, including growth, macroeconomic stability, corruption, civil war, women's rights, and democracy. During this process, we also focus on how political institutions and economic conditions shape the effect of natural resources. This allows us to understand why natural resources may have positive effects in some instances, but a negative in others.

Course Objectives and Learning Outcomes

The course objective is to enable students to evaluate the validity of competing arguments. After all, for any given topic, several legitimate positions can typically be adopted – even though they might contradict each other. Which of these positions is the ‘best’ position often depends on the criteria used to evaluate the problem: Is the objective to reduce costs or to uphold ethical standards? Is it about benefiting consumers or favoring producers? In other words, there might not be a ‘correct’ answer, but there might be a ‘best’ answer given certain criteria by which to judge a situation. To achieve this, the course offers students the opportunity to sharpen their analytical skills. Specifically, students will learn a) how to evaluate the theoretical merit of competing arguments, and b) how to obtain and understand empirical evidence to adjudicate between competing arguments.

By the end of this course, students should have a solid understanding of the consequences originating from natural resources. Specifically, their conceptual learning will include the effects of natural resources on economic growth, regime tyupe, and political violence. In addition, they will know about the relationship between natural resources and corruption, social norms, and international cooperation. More generally, students should be able to make sense of messy real-world situations by examining competing arguments in a theoretically-informed and evidence-based way. Students will know how to identify competing answers; they will have learned how to determine appropriate criteria for judging their respective merit; and students will be able to evaluate rival hypotheses. To measure their progress with respect to these learning outcomes, students will write essays analyzing current real-world issues, including policy recommendations. Furthermore, students will present their findings verbally in the form of public presentations. Lastly, students will need to arrive at their own conclusions, and defend them, in the context of seminar-style discussions.

Teaching Method

Issues in political economy often offer no ‘correct’ answer but only a ‘best’ answer that are most appropriate given some criteria by which to evaluate the possible answers. Consequently, this course offers an opportunity to prepare for a career in settings where there are no clear-cut answers either, such as consulting, finance and law. This is also the case if you pursue an academic career where your cutting-edge research will ‘boldly go where no man has gone before.’

I will use teaching methods that will require you to develop skills required to succeed in these settings. For this reason, each class will be divided into two parts. The first part of class will be devoted to a seminar-style discussion of the readings. While I will provide guidance to ensure we get to the main take-away points of this week’s readings, this is a space to explore the arguments presented in the readings. The second part of class will involve case studies using real world data and situations. Each team will develop answers to the problems posed in the case study using the theories discussed in today’s class. We subsequently will compare and contrast the different solutions of all teams.

I subscribe to these teaching methods not only to prepare you for the workplace, but also from a pedagogical perspective. Research shows that student learning is enhanced by providing active learning opportunities. This implies that you will learn more if I engage you with tasks than if I would simply lecture to you.

Assignments and Academic Calendar

1/17 – Introduction

no readings

Part I: Natural Resources and Economic Growth

1/24 – Economic effects of Natural Resources

Required reading

David I Harvey, Neil M Kellard, Jakob B Madsen, and Mark E Wohar. The Prebisch-Singer Hypothesis: Four Centuries of Evidence. *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, 92(2):367–377, May 2010.

Christopher Blattman, Jason Hwang, and Jeffrey G Williamson. Winners and losers in the commodity lottery: The impact of terms of trade growth and volatility in the Periphery 1870–1939. *Journal of Development Economics*, 82(1):156–179, January 2007.

M.J. Kurtz and S.M. Brooks. Conditioning the ”Resource Curse”: Globalization, Human Capital, and Growth in Oil-Rich Nations. *Comparative Political Studies*, 44(6):747–770, May 2011.

Jonas B Bunte. Wage Bargaining, Inequality, and the Dutch Disease. *International Studies Quarterly*, 60(4):677–692, December 2016.

Recommended reading

Lucas I González and Germán Lodola. The Impact of Oil Rents on Subnational Development: Evidence from Argentina. *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 54(4):550–570, December 2019.

Emily Sinnott. Commodity Prices and Fiscal Policy in Latin America and the Caribbean. *Working Paper*, pages 1–41, January 2009.

D Zakharova and P A Medas. A primer on fiscal analysis in oil-producing countries. *IMF Working Papers*, 2009.

F van der Ploeg and S Poelhekke. Volatility and the natural resource curse. *Oxford Economic Papers*, 61(4):727–760, September 2009.

K. Ismail. The Structural Manifestation of the ‘Dutch Disease’: The Case of Oil Exporting Countries. *IMF Working Papers*, 10(103):1–37, 2010.

Ragnar Torvik. Learning by doing and the Dutch disease. *European Economic Review*, 45(2):285–306, 2001.

Michael Alexeev and Robert Conrad. The elusive curse of oil. *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, 91(3):586–598, August 2009.

Brock Smith. Journal of Development Economics. *Journal of Development Economics*, 116(C):57–73, September 2015.

Rabah Arezki and Frederick van der Ploeg. Do Natural Resources Depress Income Per Capita? *Review of Development Economics*, 15(3):504–521, July 2011.

1/31 – Institutions shaping the Resource Curse

Required reading

Hamid Mohtadi, Michael L. Ross, Uchechukwu Jarrett, and Stefan Ruediger. Kleptocracy and tax evasion under resource abundance. *Economics & Politics*, 31(3):323–373, July 2019.

James A. Robinson, Ragnar Torvik, and Thierry Verdier. Political foundations of the resource curse. *Journal of Development Economics*, 79(2):447–468, 2006.

Jørgen Juel Andersen and Silje Aslaksen. Constitutions and the resource curse. *Journal of Development Economics*, 87(2):227–246, October 2008.

E Bulte and R. Damania. Resources for sale: corruption, democracy and the natural resource curse. *The BE Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy*, 2008.

Recommended reading

Halvor Mehlum, Karl Moene, and Ragnar Torvik. Institutions and the Resource Curse. *The Economic Journal*, 116(508):1–20, 2006.

Halvor Mehlum, Karl Moene, and Ragnar Torvik. Cursed by resources or institutions? *World Economy*, 29(8):1117–1131, 2006.

Aaron Tornell and Philip R Lane. The Voracity Effect. *The American Economic Review*, 89(1):22–46, March 1999.

Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson. Economic Backwardness in Political Perspective. *American Political Science Review*, 100(01):115–131, 2006.

Xavier Sala-i Martin and Arvind Subramanian. Addressing the Natural Resource Curse: An Illustration from Nigeria. *Journal of African Economies*, 22(4):570–615, May 2012.

Daron Acemoglu, James A. Robinson, and Thierry Verdier. Alfred Marshall Lecture: Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule: A Model of Personal Rule. *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 2(2/3):162–192, April 2004.

Jonathan Isham, Michael Woolcock, Lant Pritchett, and Gwen Busby. The Varieties of Resource Experience: Natural Resource Export Structures and the Political Economy of Economic Growth. *The World Bank Economic Review*, 19(2):141–174, January 2005.

Christa N Brunnschweiler and Erwin H Bulte. The resource curse revisited and revised: A tale of paradoxes and red herrings. *Journal of Environmental Economics and Management*, 55(3):248–264, May 2008.

2/7 – Workshop: Puzzle

⇒ PAPER #1 DUE: PUZZLE

Part II: Natural Resources and Regime Type

2/14 – The relationship between Oil and Democracy

Required readings

Kristopher W Ramsay. Revisiting the Resource Curse: Natural Disasters, the Price of Oil, and Democracy. *International Organization*, 65(03):507–529, July 2011.

J J Andersen and Michael L. Ross. The Big Oil Change: A Closer Look at the Haber-Menaldo Analysis. *Comparative Political Studies*, 47(7):993–1021, May 2014.

Stephen Haber and Victor Menaldo. Do Natural Resources Fuel Authoritarianism? A Reappraisal of the Resource Curse. *American Political Science Review*, 105(01):1–26, January 2011.

Sarah M Brooks and Marcus J Kurtz. Oil and Democracy: Endogenous Natural Resources and the Political “Resource Curse”. *International Organization*, 70(2):279–311, April 2016.

Recommended readings

Michael L. Ross. Does Oil Hinder Democracy? *World Politics*, 53(3):325–361, 2001.

Nathan M Jensen and Leonard Wantchekon. Resource Wealth and Political Regimes in Africa. *Comparative Political Studies*, 37(7):816–841, September 2004.

S Aslaksen. Oil and democracy: More than a cross-country correlation? *Journal of Peace Research*, 47(4):421–431, July 2010.

Kevin K Tsui. More Oil, Less Democracy: Evidence from Worldwide Crude Oil Discoveries. *The Economic Journal*, 121(551):89–115, January 2010.

Jørgen Juel Andersen and Silje Aslaksen. Journal of Development Economics. *Journal of Development Economics*, 100(1):89–106, January 2013.

Jesus Crespo Cuaresma, Harald Oberhofer, and Paul A Raschky. Oil and the duration of dictatorships. *Public Choice*, 148(3-4):505–530, June 2010.

L D Omgba. On the Duration of Political Power in Africa: The Role of Oil Rents. *Comparative Political Studies*, 42(3):416–436, December 2008.

Benjamin Thomas Smith. Oil Wealth and Regime Survival in the Developing World, 1960-1999. *American Journal of Political Science*, 48(2):232–246, 2004.

J Ulfelder. Natural-Resource Wealth and the Survival of Autocracy. *Comparative Political Studies*, 40(8):995–1018, August 2007.

Romain Wacziarg. The First Law of Petropolitics. *Economica*, 79:641–657, December 2011.

M. Herb. No Representation without Taxation? Rents, Development and Democracy. *Comparative Politics*, 37(3):297–317, 2005.

2/21 – The mechanisms connecting natural resources and regime type

Required readings

Michael L. Ross. Does Oil Hinder Democracy? *World Politics*, 53(3):325–361, 2001.

S Krishnarajan. Economic Crisis, Natural Resources, and Irregular Leader Removal in Autocracies. *International Studies Quarterly*, 63:726–741, 2019.

Maria Carreri and Oeindrila Dube. Do Natural Resources Influence Who Comes to Power, and How? *The Journal of Politics*, 79(2):502–518, April 2017.

Brandon de la Cuesta, Lucy Martin, Helen V Milner, and Daniel L Nielson. Owing It: Accountability and Citizens' Ownership over Aid, Oil, and Taxes. *Working Paper*, pages 1–28, September 2017.

Recommended readings

Ji Yeon Hong. How Natural Resources Affect Authoritarian Leaders' Provision of Public Services: Evidence from China. *The Journal of Politics*, 80(1):178–194, January 2018.

G Egorov, S Guriev, and K. Sonin. Why Resource-poor Dictators Allow Freer Media: A Theory and Evidence from Panel Data. *American Political Science Review*, 103(04):645, November 2009.

Kevin M Morrison. Oil, Nontax Revenue, and the Redistributive Foundations of Regime Stability. *International Organization*, 63(01):107–138, 2009.

James A. Robinson, Ragnar Torvik, and Thierry Verdier. Political foundations of the resource curse. *Journal of Development Economics*, 79(2):447–468, 2006.

F Caselli and T Cunningham. Leader behaviour and the natural resource curse. *Oxford Economic Papers*, 61(4):628–650, September 2009.

Benjamin B Smith. *Hard times in the lands of plenty: oil politics in Iran and Indonesia*. Cornell University Press, 2007.

J J Andersen and Michael L. Ross. The Big Oil Change: A Closer Look at the Haber-Menaldo Analysis. *Comparative Political Studies*, 47(7):993–1021, May 2014.

David H Bearce and J A Laks Hutnick. Toward an Alternative Explanation for the Resource Curse: Natural Resources, Immigration, and Democratization. *Comparative Political Studies*, 44(6):689–718, May 2011.

Markus Brückner, Antonio Ciccone, and Andrea Tesei. Oil price shocks, income, and democracy. *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 94(2):389–399, 2012.

Romain Wacziarg. The First Law of Petropolitics. *Economica*, 79:641–657, December 2011.

Y M Liou and P Musgrave. Refining the Oil Curse: Country-Level Evidence From Exogenous Variations in Resource Income. *Comparative Political Studies*, 47(11):1584–1610, August 2014.

M. Herb. No Representation without Taxation? Rents, Development and Democracy. *Comparative Politics*, 37(3):297–317, 2005.

Francesco Caselli and Andrea Tesei. Resource Windfalls, Political Regimes, and Political Stability. *Review of Economics and Statistics*, pages 1–61, March 2015.

D Diaz-Rioseco. Blessing and Curse: Oil and Subnational Politics in the Argentine Provinces. *Comparative Political Studies*, September 2016.

Thad Dunning. *Crude democracy: Natural resource wealth and political regimes*. Cambridge University Press, 2008. [Chapter 1]

Tania Masi and Roberto Ricciuti. The heterogeneous effect of oil discoveries on democracy. *Economics & Politics*, 31(3):374–402, July 2019.

2/28 – Workshop: Hypotheses

⇒ PAPER #2 DUE: HYPOTHESES

Part III: Natural Resources and Violence

3/6 – Natural resources and civil war

Required readings

Michael L. Ross. What Do We Know about Natural Resources and Civil War? *Journal of Peace Research*, 41(3):337–356, May 2004.

J Paine. Rethinking the conflict “resource curse”: How oil wealth prevents center-seeking civil wars. *International Organization*, pages 1–35, November 2016.

James Fearon. Primary Commodity Exports and Civil War. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 49(4):483–507, August 2005.

Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler. Greed and grievance in civil war. *Oxford Economic Papers*, 56(2355):663–595, 2004.

Recommended readings

J Sorens. Mineral production, territory, and ethnic rebellion: The role of rebel constituencies. *Journal of Peace Research*, 48(5):571–585, September 2011.

Michael L. Ross. A Closer Look at Oil, Diamonds, and Civil War. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 9(1):265–300, 2006.

Anca M Cotet and Kevin K Tsui. Oil and Conflict: What Does the Cross Country Evidence Really Show? *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics*, 5(1):49–80, January 2013.

C.N. Brunnschweiler and E.H. Bulte. Natural resources and violent conflict: resource abundance, dependence, and the onset of civil wars. *Oxford Economic Papers*, 61(4):651–674, September 2009.

M Basedau and J Lay. Resource Curse or Rentier Peace? The Ambiguous Effects of Oil Wealth and Oil Dependence on Violent Conflict. *Journal of Peace Research*, 46(6):757–776, November 2009.

Kjetil Bjorvatn and Alireza Naghavi. European Journal of Political Economy. *European Journal of Political Economy*, 27(4):740–748, December 2011.

Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler. On economic causes of civil war. *Oxford Economic Papers*, 50(4):563–573, 1998.

Katharina Wick and Erwin H Bulte. Contesting resources – rent seeking, conflict and the natural resource curse. *Public Choice*, 128(3-4):457–476, April 2006.

James D Fearon. Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer than Others? *Journal of Peace Research*, 41(3):275–301, May 2004.

James Fearon. Primary Commodity Exports and Civil War. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 49(4):483–507, August 2005.

James D Fearon and David D Laitin. Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War. *American Political Science Review*, 97(1):75–90, February 2003.

P. Le Billon. The political ecology of war: natural resources and armed conflicts. *Political Geography*, 20(5):561–584, June 2001.

Paul Collier, A. Hoeffler, and D Rohner. Beyond greed and grievance: feasibility and civil war. *Oxford Economic Papers*, 61(1):1–27, March 2008.

Timothy Besley and Torsten Persson. The Logic of Political Violence. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 126(3):1411–1445, August 2011.

Curtis Bell and Scott Wolford. Oil Discoveries, Shifting Power, and Civil Conflict. *International Studies Quarterly*, 59(3):n/a–n/a, August 2014.

Michael L. Ross. How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence from Thirteen Cases. *International Organization*, 58(01), March 2004.

3/13 – Workshop: Research Design

⇒ PAPER #3 DUE: RESEARCH DESIGN

3/20 – Spring Break

no class

3/27 – No class (ISA)

(no class)

4/3 – Location of natural resources and civil war

Required reading

Päivi Lujala. The spoils of nature: Armed civil conflict and rebel access to natural resources. *Journal of Peace Research*, 47(1):15–28, September 2009.

V. Asal, M Findley, J A Piazza, and J I Walsh. Political Exclusion, Oil, and Ethnic Armed Conflict. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 60(8):1343–1367, February 2015.

O Dube and J F Vargas. Commodity Price Shocks and Civil Conflict: Evidence from Colombia. *The Review of Economic Studies*, 80(4):1384–1421, October 2013.

Gudrun Østby, Ragnhild Nordås, and Jan Ketil Rød. Regional Inequalities and Civil Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa. *International Studies Quarterly*, 53(2):301–324, June 2009.

Recommended reading

M Morelli and D Rohner. Resource Concentration and Civil Wars. *NBER Working Paper*, (20129), 2014.

Matthias Basedau and Thomas Richter. Why do some oil exporters experience civil war but others do not?: investigating the conditional effects of oil. *European Political Science Review*, 6(04):549–574, November 2013.

E Aspinall. The Construction of Grievance: Natural Resources and Identity in a Separatist Conflict. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 51(6):950–972, December 2007.

Ernesto Dal Bó and Pedro Dal Bó. Workers, Warriors, and Criminals: Social Conflict in General Equilibrium. *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 9(4):646–677, May 2011.

Z Rubinovitz and E Rettig. Crude peace: The role of oil trade in the Israeli-Egyptian peace negotiations. *International Studies Quarterly*, 62:371–382, 2018.

Part IV: Natural Resources and Social Politics

4/10 – Gender

Required reading

Michael L. Ross. Oil, Islam, and Women. *American Political Science Review*, 102(01):107–123, February 2008.

S E Maurer and A V Potlogea. Fueling the gender gap? Oil and women’s labor and marriage market outcomes. *CEP Discussion Paper*, 2014.

Joel W Simmons. Does oil substitute for patriarchy? *Economics & Politics*, 31(3):293–322, December 2018.

Yu-Ming Liou and Paul Musgrave. Oil, Autocratic Survival, and the Gendered Resource Curse: When Inefficient Policy Is Politically Expedient. *International Studies Quarterly*, 60(3):440–456, September 2016.

Recommended reading

M Groh and C Rothschild. Oil, Islam, Women, and Geography: A Comment on Ross (2008). *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, 2012.

Alice Kang. Studying Oil, Islam, and Women as if Political Institutions Mattered. *Politics and Gender*, 5(04):560–568, November 2009.

Mounira M Charrad. Kinship, Islam, or Oil: Culprits of Gender Inequality? *Politics and Gender*, 5(04):546, November 2009.

Teri L Caraway. Comparative Political Economy, Gender, and Labor Markets. *Politics and Gender*, 5(04):568, November 2009.

Pippa Norris. Petroleum Patriarchy? A Response to Ross. *Politics and Gender*, 5(04):553, November 2009.

Michael L. Ross. Does Oil Wealth Hurt Women? A Reply to Caraway, Charrad, Kang, and Norris. *Politics and Gender*, 5(04):575, November 2009.

Ragui Assaad. Why Did Economic Liberalization Lead to Feminization of the Labor Force in Morocco and De-feminization in Egypt? *Working Paper*, pages 1–26, November 2004.

J W Simmons. Resource Wealth and Womens Economic and Political Power in the U.S. States. *Comparative Political Studies*, 49(1):115–152, December 2016.

Lisa Blaydes and Drew A Linzer. The political economy of women’s support for fundamentalist Islam. *World Politics*, 60(04):576–609, 2008.

Alberto Alesina, P Giuliano, and N Nunn. On the Origins of Gender Roles: Women and the Plough. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 128(2):469–530, April 2013.

4/17 – International investment by national oil companies

Required reading

Andrew Cheon. Developing global champions: Why national oil companies expand abroad. *Economics & Politics*, 31(3):403–427, July 2019.

Adam William Chalmers and Susanna Theresia Mocker. The end of exceptionalism? Explaining Chinese National Oil Companies’ overseas investments. *Review of International Political Economy*, 24(1):119–143, January 2017.

Jonas Meckling, Bo Kong, and Tanvi Madan. Oil and state capitalism: government-firm cooptation in China and India. *Review of International Political Economy*, 22(6):1159–1187, December 2015.

P.J. Luong and J Sierra. The Domestic Political Conditions for International Economic Expansion: Lessons From Latin American National Oil Companies. *Comparative Political Studies*, 48(14):2010–2043, November 2015.

Recommended reading

Scott Pegg. Resources Policy. *Resources Policy*, 37(2):160–167, June 2012.

A Cheon, M Lackner, and J Urpelainen. Instruments of Political Control: National Oil Companies, Oil Prices, and Petroleum Subsidies. 48(3):370–402, February 2015.

Steffen Hertog. Defying the Resource Curse: Explaining Successful State-Owned Enterprises in Rentier States. *World Politics*, 62(02):261, March 2010.

Shai Bernstein, Josh Lerner, and Antoinette Schoar. The Investment Strategies of Sovereign Wealth Funds. *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 27(2):219–237, April 2013.

Jeffrey M Chwieroth. Fashions and Fads in Finance: The Political Foundations of Sovereign Wealth Fund Creation. *International Studies Quarterly*, 58(4):752–763, June 2014.

Sarah Eaton and Zhang Ming. A principal–agent analysis of China’s sovereign wealth system: Byzantine by design. *Review of International Political Economy*, 17(3):481–506, August 2010.

Victor Shih. Tools of Survival: Sovereign Wealth Funds in Singapore and China. *Geopolitics*, 14(2):328–344, May 2009.

P Rose. Sovereigns as Shareholders. *North Carolina Law Review*, pages 1–67, November 2013.

April Knill, Bong-Soo Lee, and Nathan Mauck. Journal of Corporate Finance. *Journal of Corporate Finance*, 18(1):108–123, February 2012.

Sofia A Johan, April Knill, and Nathan Mauck. Determinants of sovereign wealth fund investment in private equity vs public equity. 44(2):155–172, February 2013.

Rolando Avendaño, Javier Santiso, Organisation for Economic Co-operation Centre, and Development Development. Are Sovereign Wealth Funds’ Investments Politically Biased? OECD Working Paper, 2009.

D.W. Drezner. Sovereign wealth funds and the (in) security of global finance. *Journal of International Affairs*, 2008.

Adrian J Shin. Primary Resources, Secondary Labor: Natural Resources and Immigration Policy. *International Studies Quarterly*, 63(4):805–818, June 2019.

Michael L. Ross and Erik Voeten. Oil and International Cooperation. *International Studies Quarterly*, 60(1):85–97, March 2016.

4/24 – Workshop: Preliminary Results

⇒ PAPER #4 DUE: PRELIMINARY RESULTS

⇒ CONFERENCE SUBMISSION DUE ON 5/10

⇒ PAPER #5 DUE ON 5/10

Structure of Class

Each class has several components:

1. At the beginning of the semester, the class will be divided into four groups of equal size. Prior to each class, each group is assigned two journal articles from the readings assigned that week. Their task is to prepare two short presentations to be uploaded to eLearning by 11:59pm the day prior to class. There are two types of presentations:
 - (a) The first type of presentation introduces the an article. It pays particular attention to a) the motivation for the research question, b) the competing hypotheses examined, c) the choice of, and justification for, the research design, and d) a summary of the findings.

- (b) The second type of presentation discusses the strengths and weaknesses of the article. This presentation should focus on a) whether the research puzzle is well identified, b) if the competing hypotheses are valid, c) if the choice of methodology is appropriate, d) whether the operationalization of variables is acceptable, and e) whether the findings presented by the authors are credible.
2. Your presentations will be used to motivate the discussion of the readings assigned for that week. For that purpose, I will integrate the two presentations examining the same article – the one that summarizes it and the second that criticizes it. This will help us explore the strengths and weaknesses of each article, always with the intention to draw lessons for your own research projects.
3. I will conclude the class by reviewing the key ‘take-away’ points from this class and provide some guidance regarding the readings for the following week.

Grading Policy

This course will use several types of assignments to assess your learning.

- 5 Papers (5 × 30 = 150 points): The short papers have a word limit of 1000 words each. The four papers will have different foci:
 1. Puzzle, Research question, and significance: The first paper will require you to identify an empirical puzzle that you would like to explain. It will also require you to detail why finding an explanation for the research puzzle is of normative significance.
 2. Three hypotheses: The second paper will ask you to identify the two most convincing types of explanations for your puzzle that currently already exist in the literature. In addition, you are will introduce an original third hypothesis that has currently not been suggested by anyone.
 3. Research Design: In the third paper, you will outline your plan for obtaining evidence capable of adjudicating among the competing hypotheses you introduced in the previous paper. You should justify why a particular type of data and a specific methodology are capable of producing such judgements.
 4. Preliminary Analysis: In this paper, you will show your preliminary results. These may be the findings from a statistical analysis, or the empirical results of a structured case study, or the like.
 5. Final paper: The final paper consists of the previous four papers. It also incorporates the feedback that you received on each of the previous papers.
- Group Presentations (7 × 10 points = 70 points): Each group will have to prepare two short group-presentations each week. The first presentation will introduce an article to class while the second will critically evaluate another article.
- Workshop Presentations (4 × 30 points = 120 points): We will have four workshops where you present your paper #1 through #4. In other words, in the first workshop on the puzzle, you will present your paper introducing your puzzle to the class; In the second workshop, you will present the potential hypotheses for your Puzzle submitted with paper #2, etc.
- Conference abstract (25 points) and submission (25 points): Submission of a proposal based on the research project to an academic conference of your choice. Confirmation of the submission is required.

- Class Attendance and Participation (100 points): Devoted class participation is essential for this course's success. As such, students' final grades will depend both on the quantity as well as the quality of the contributions during class. I will use a random name generator to ensure equal opportunity for participation.

The final course grade calculation therefore consists of the following components:

- Papers: 150 points
- Group presentations: 70 points
- Workshop presentation: 120 points
- Submitted conference proposal: 50 points
- Attendance and Participation: 110 points
- **Total: 500 points**

Note: Please consider the course policies on late work, missed exams, and grade disputes at the end of this document.

Expectations

What I expect of my students

- Willingness to work: As a general rule, one credit represents three hours of academic work per week (including lectures, laboratories, recitations, discussion groups, field work, study, and so on), averaged over the semester. In other words, you will need to invest time into this course, otherwise the benefits and the grades you will get might not be what you want.
- Classroom etiquette: You are expected to complete the assigned readings prior to the class session for which they are scheduled. Lectures and discussions will not duplicate, but instead will build on, and hence will assume prior familiarity with, assigned readings. Your active, informed and civil participation in discussion and class activities is expected. You are responsible for remaining attentive in class, arriving prepared to discuss course materials, and respecting other members of the class as you and they participate.

What you can expect from the instructor

- I offer a learning environment that challenges you in order to provide opportunities for growth. I will be prepared to the best of my abilities.
- I encourage you to explore your own ideas in response to the assigned tasks. I will be open-minded in responding to your ideas and suggestions. I will offer constructive feedback.
- I am open to constructive feedback from you on my performance. If you have ideas or suggestions, please do not hesitate to discuss them with me. I am committed to make this the best possible classroom experience.

Course Policies

Late work

- Late papers, projects, homework, and other assignments: With regard to papers, projects and other out-of-class assignments, my late-policy is two-fold. First, due dates are due dates. Late work will be subjected to a penalty in the form of points deducted. This deduction will increase exponentially with lateness. More specifically, I will deduct 20% of the points achieved for a 12 hours delay, 50% for 24 hours, and 100% for more than 48 hours. This policy is justified as all deadlines are announced at the beginning of the semester in the syllabus (and the fact that your future boss will not be impressed if you cannot finish work assignments on time). Please note that it is always possible to hand in an assignment early.
- Incomplete coursework: Incompletes will be granted only in the case of documented long-term illness, and if you and I jointly complete the required paperwork with the Undergraduate Associate Dean of EPPS, which is available here:
<http://catalog.utdallas.edu/2013/undergraduate/policies/academic#incomplete-grades>
- Extra credit: Extra credit activities or coursework resubmission will not be permitted. Do your best the first time around.

Academic Misconduct

Students are expected to do their own assigned work. If it is determined that a student has engaged in any form of Academic Dishonesty, he or she may be given an *F* or an *N* for the course, and may face additional sanctions from the University. Academic dishonesty in any portion of the academic work for a course shall be grounds for awarding a grade of *F* or *N* for the entire course.

Sexual Harassment

University policy prohibits sexual harassment as defined in the University Policy Statement (<http://www.utdallas.edu/legal/title9/contactharass.html> and <http://www.utdallas.edu/hrm/er/complaints/harassment.php5>). This is a serious offense, and I feel strongly about addressing it. Complaints about sexual harassment should be reported to the Dean of Students, Office of Student Life, Student Union Room 1, phone 972-883-6391 or email gene.fitch@utdallas.edu. However, I also want you to know that you can also talk to me as well about any issues that come up.

Accommodations for Students with Disabilities

Participants with special needs are strongly encouraged to talk to me as soon as possible to gain maximum access to course information. It is important to me that everyone who wants to take this class is not prevented from doing so due to special needs. University policy is to provide, on a flexible and individualized basis, reasonable accommodations to students who have documented disability conditions (e.g., physical, learning, psychiatric, vision, hearing, or systemic) that may affect their ability to participate in course activities or to meet course requirements. Students with disabilities are encouraged to contact the Office of Student AccessAbility and their instructors to discuss their individual needs for accommodations. The Office of Student AccessAbility is located in SSB 3.200. Staff can be reached at studentaccess@utdallas.edu or by calling 972-883-2098. For more information see <http://www.utdallas.edu/studentaccess/> Please note, however, that if you have any concerns regarding how special needs might affect the assessment of your performance, you have to talk to me *prior* to the date of the assessment. I cannot make grade adjustments after the fact.

Statement regarding diversity

I strongly believe that diversity is an asset rather than a liability. For one, in a globalized world you will be exposed to people who are different from you. Therefore, it is necessary to recognize that people who are different in almost all cases bring something valuable to the table: Experiences that you can learn from, insights that were not apparent to you, skills that you do not have, or knowledge that you can benefit from. It is my intention to create a learning environment in this class that allows everyone to share their unique strengths. This is not only my personal belief. After all, research shows that the best work is usually produced by groups that combine the different comparative advantages of their group members.

I therefore emphasize that I will welcome anyone to my class, regardless of your sexual orientation, religious observances, political orientation, physical characteristics, cultural background, nationality, or any other characteristic. I recognize that I myself am not perfect, but I promise you to make every effort. If you have any concerns with respect to your acceptance in the classroom I strongly encourage you to talk with me.

Technology in the classroom

Laptops are not allowed. Similarly, any other technological items such as cell phones, Ipods, MP3 players, pagers, and PDAs need to be turned OFF during class. That's right: turn it off, rather than just setting it to vibrate. The purpose for this policy is that I want to minimize distractions during class. I do want you to be focused on the learning activities that will be going on. If I notice that you are not paying attention but instead are focused on your cell phone I reserve the right to do something about it. Further, you are not allowed to make video- or audio-recordings of the classes without my prior permission. I reserve the right to legal action in case I observe you doing so. The reason why the dialogue between professors and students should stay within the closed community of the classroom is simple. After all, academic freedom and completely honest communication in the classroom requires a certain degree of privacy for all the people in the classroom. Students and teachers alike need to be able to be frank, and they need to express their emotions honestly. A video- or audio recording will seriously impede the willingness of students to come forward and engage in an open and honest discussion.

UT Dallas Syllabus Policies and Procedures

The information contained in the following link constitutes the University's policies and procedures segment of the course syllabus. Please go to <http://go.utdallas.edu/syllabus-policies> for these policies.

The descriptions and timelines contained in this syllabus are subject to change at the discretion of the Professor.